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Abstract 
9 May 1950 was a milestone in the history of European Integration when the French Foreign 
Minister Robert Schuman proposed the pooling of French and West German supplies of coal and 
steel; and made an invitation to other European states willing to be involved in this plan. The 
invitation for the conference on Schuman Plan came to the agenda of British Parliament on 26 
June as a motion by Conservative Party demanding Labour Party Government to accept the 
invitation which had already been declined at the end of May, 1950. Following the debate on 26-
27 June, The Economist published an article titled “Broker or Brakeman?” in which the Schuman 
Plan discussions on British Parliament were explored. The Journal was arguing that “it is the 
resemblances, not the differences, between the outlook of Government and Opposition that are 
most striking” on this issue of foreign policy. Although this argument makes sense to a certain 
extent; this study argues that it was the adversarial nature of British party politics that shaped the 
general structure of the above mentioned parliamentary debate. Moreover, this nature contributed 
the decision makers to apply exceptionalist discourses and policies when it came to European 
Integration, therefore to a British non-involvement in the Plan. 
Key Words: Schuman Plan, British Conservative Party, British Labour Party, adversarialism, 
exceptionalism. 
 
Öz 
Fransız Dışişleri Bakanı Robert Schuman’ın Fransa ve Batı Almanya’nın kömür ve çelik 
rezervlerinin birleştirilmesini önermesi ve diğer Avrupa devletlerine de bu plana katılmaları için 
davet göndermesi ile 9 Mayıs 1950 Avrupa bütünleşmesi tarihinde bir dönüm noktası oldu. 
Aslında 1950 Mayıs’ının sonunda Britanya tarafından reddedilen Schuman Planı için 
düzenlenecek konferansa katılım daveti Britanya Parlamentosu gündemine 26 Haziran’da 
Muhafazakâr Parti’nin İşçi Partisi hükümetinin bu daveti kabulünü talep eden önergesiyle gelmiş 
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oldu. 26-27 Haziran’daki parlamento görüşmelerinin ardından The Economist dergisi bu 
görüşmelerin ele alındığı “Simsar mı Frenci mi?” başlık bir makale yayınladı. Makaleye göre bu 
dış politika konusunda “Muhalefet ve İktidar tutumları arasında belirgin olan görüş farklılıkları 
değil, benzerlikleriydi”. Her ne kadar bu argüman belirli bir dereceye kadar anlaşılabilir olsa da, 
bu çalışmada Britanya siyasi partilerinin hasımlığa dayanan yapısının yukarıda bahsi geçen 
parlamento görüşmelerinin genel çerçevesini belirlediği savunulmaktadır. Ayrıca, bu siyasi yapı 
Britanya karar alıcılarının Avrupa bütünleşmesi konusunda istisnacılık söylemleri ve politikalarını 
benimsemelerine ve nihayetinde Britanya’nın Schuman Planı dışında kalmasına katkıda 
bulunduğu belirtilmektedir. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Schuman Planı, Britanya Muhafazakâr Partisi, Britanya İşçi Partisi, 
hasımlık, istisnacılık  
 
1. Introduction 
The old continent, Europe, was unable to keep up with the economies of 
USA and USSR after the Second World War. Its economic fate was in the 
hands of the former as one of the emerging superpower of the time. In order to 
achieve the continent’s survival, European integration was seen as a cure to the 
problem by some European nation states. Because divided Europe was not only 
the reason of war and weak economy but also “the ultimate threat” for the 
future 1 . In other words, referring to Alan Milward’s conceptualization, 
integration would be the rescuer of the nation states in Europe2. 
In addition to the realities of post-war period, a united Europe ideal had 
been in the mind of some intellectuals and politicians since the end of First 
World War. Briand Plan, Organization for European Economic Cooperation, 
Council of Europe3 were some of the attempts to achieve it, yet none of them 
could get as close as Schuman Plan. Therefore, 9 May 1950 was a milestone in 
the history of European integration when the French Foreign Minister Robert 
Schuman proposed the pooling of French and West German supplies of coal and 
steel; and made an invitation to other European states willing to be involved in 
this plan. Given the peril of nationalism after the Second World War, the 
proposal was designated as a supra-national authority which would manage the 
pooling. This supra-national body, aka High Authority, would be able to limit 
the economic sovereignty of participant nation states and independent of 
governments. The invitation made by French Government did not necessitate 
the acceptance of supra-nationalism in advance for the involvement in detailed 
talks, but it demanded that no other alternative mechanism to be discussed in the 
conference table4. 
                                                            
1 Hörber 2006, p. 209. 
2 Milward 1992. 
3 For a detailed analysis of these institutional attempts; Dinan 1999; Dedman 1996; Urwin 2014. 
4 Lord 1998, p. 25. 
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Britain, as one of the invited European state, was informed in the same 
day of the announcement of the plan according to British Foreign Office. 
Schuman, on the other hand, expressed his willingness for British participation, 
yet mentioned his awareness regarding the psychological and technical 
difficulties that Britain could have while answering journalists’ questions. For 
him, even if Britain did not participate, she could conform to the new 
environment after having realized the success of the proposal. Schuman’s 
concern proved itself in the meetings and exchange of notes between French 
and British officials which lasted until 3 June when France declared the 
impossibility of any progress given the existing contradictory standpoints of two 
sides5, while at the end of the May, Britain had already declined to join to 
detailed talks. Therefore the related conference on Schuman Plan started on 20 
June in Paris, without British participation. However, opposition party of the 
time in Britain, Conservative Party, brought the issue to the House of Commons 
on 26 June with a motion calling the Labour Party government to involve in the 
negotiations. The Prime Minister Attlee replied this move with an amendment 
to the motion expressing British inability to join and after a two day long 
debate; it was the government’s amendment which was accepted by majority. 
This process was followed by signature of Paris Treaty in 1951, again without 
British participation, in which Schuman’s proposal was realized and European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)6 was created symbolizing the first step 
towards European Economic Community (EEC) and today’s European Union 
(EU).  
Out of this historical decision of Britain, there emerged significant 
amount of studies evaluating Attlee government either by criticising with 
“missing the bus/boat” metaphor or by praying it as the decision was right and 
timely. From the first side, according to Deighton, due to its disdain towards the 
continent and fear of losing sovereignty which were shared by both Labour and 
Conservative Parties, Britain lost the initiative in Europe7. Another contribution 
coming from Dell, a former Labour Minister, argued that British decline for 
joining to negotiations was a failure which affected the whole of post-war 
history of the country8. Anthony Nutting also thought that it was the most 
significant chance that Britain missed to become leader of Europe9. In addition 
to these studies, Wurm made an important summary of this approach in his 
                                                            
5 Sham and Younger 1967, p. 15-16. 
6 Paris Treaty was signed by France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxemburg. 
7 Deighton 1990, p. 16. 
8 Dell 1995, p. 284. 
9 Nutting 1960. 
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review article titled Britain and European Integration, 1945-6310. From the 
other side of the coin, Bullock and Young wrote that it was 1955-57 period11 
that could be named as “missed opportunity” rather than Schuman Plan 
decision12. Finally, according to Kaiser, Britain did not make a wrong decision 
as the non-involvement in Schuman Plan and ECSC did not harm the British 
economy13 and the same thought was shared by Gowland et al14 claiming that 
“the chequered history of the ECSC itself scarcely suggested that Britain had 
missed out on a opportunity”. 
Although these studies as a whole contributed to development of an 
academic field dealing with relations between Britain and Europe, the 
retrospective assumptions include “might-have-beens” as Wurm argued, and it 
seems hard to make these kinds of precise judgements15. Rather it would be 
better to focus on how Labour government made this decision and what forces 
shaped it to emerge as refusal? Therefore the framework chosen for this study is 
the British domestic politics itself, in particular the debates in parliament 
between the major political parties as the answers for above questions can 
mainly be found there. In short, the aim of this study is not to assess if the 
Schuman Plan was a missed chance or not, as plenty of studies did until now; 
but to analyse the effect of the relations between parties in British parliament on 
the decision not to participate in the Plan. Especially the debate and voting on 
26-27 June was an evidence of tension between the two main parties of Britain 
and affected the result of non-participation to the conference on Schuman Plan. 
As a result, this study will be analysing the speeches made during two days and 
interpreting the nature of approach provided by MPs of both sides. The online 
archive of British Parliament, Hansard, will be the primary source for this 
analysis. In the following parts, reflections of Schuman Plan in the House of 
Commons will be examined firstly. Then the speeches will be categorized as 
non-participation decision and its possible results; and reasons of non-
participation to show the adversary nature of both parties’ stance. In the last 
part, there will be concluding remarks. 
                                                            
10 Wurm 1998. 
11 This period refers to Messina Conference of 1955 and signature of Rome Treaty of 1957 
establishing EEC. Britain also refused to join Messina Conference where the six countries 
involved in Schuman Plan decided to initiate a market “free from all customs duties and all 
quantitative restrictions”. This attempt was institutionalized by the signature of Rome Treaty 
(Urwin, D.W.,2014: 89) 
12 Bullock 1985. Young 1993. 
13 Kaiser 1996. 
14 Gowland et al. 2010, p. 34. 
15 Wurm 1998. 
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2. Reflections of Schuman Plan in the House of Commons 
Schuman Plan was brought to the agenda of British Parliament on 11 
May by Prime Minister Attlee. According to him, it was a proposal with 
“far-reaching implications for the future economic structure of 
participating countries; and this aspect will require very careful study by His 
Majesty's Government and the other Governments concerned. His Majesty's 
Government will approach the problem in a sympathetic spirit and desire to 
make it clear at the outset that they welcome this French initiative to end the 
age-long feud with Germany and so bring unity and peace to Europe”16. 
This warm welcome was followed Churchill’s demand for a debate as he 
and other Conservative MPs were asking for the details of the proposal. Since 
Attlee needed time to look into proposal and thought that it was early yet, there 
were no more debates followed on the issue in the House of Commons. 
Although there were some comments on the Plan in the discussions of other 
debate topics from the parliamentary agenda, the next comprehensive debate 
was held on 13 June. However this was the time when all the diplomatic 
exchange had already ended between France and Labour cabinet17. Therefore 
Prime Minister dedicated his time of the opening speech in the debate to explain 
the completed procedure of exchange. According to him, French Government 
was not clear how the proposal would work in practice and in theory, although 
they had already clarify pooling of the resources to a High Authority. Since his 
government did not want to give prior commitment, Britain neither accepted nor 
rejected the proposal and this was assumed as a substantial difference of 
approach by French Government. As a result of this, Britain would not 
participate to the talks which would begin on 20 June and “put forward any 
alternative proposal”. By giving the “hope” of association with the Plan in the 
future, he concluded his remarks by reminding Britain’s international 
responsibilities18.  
Just after Prime Minister finished his speech, the opposition served the 
information of a statement issued by the National Executive Committee (NEC) 
of Labour Party on the same morning of the debate. That document which the 
opposition was talking about was one of the most well-known and contentious 
documents of British post-war history, “European Unity”. In this document, 
                                                            
16 Hansard, 11 May 1950, vol. 475 column 588. 
17https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/conclusions_of_a_meeting_of_the_cabinet_on_the_refusal_to_parti
cipate_in_the_negotiations_on_the_schuman_plan_london_2_june_1950-en-8737a230-6924-
4905-8004-dee4385ad38e.html (accessed on 20 January 2018) 
18 Hansard, 13 June 1950, vol 476, column 36-37. 
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NEC was considering the supra-national attempts in Europe as anti-socialist and 
in order to preserve the national control over coal and steel industries Britain 
had to be out of this grouping as these industries were “central to the party’s 
nationalization programme”19. This was interpreted as one of the most socialist 
document of British post-war history as NEC was embracing it as a prerequisite 
for further integration initiatives. 
Although these discussions brought some main themes to the agenda of 
the House of Commons, it was the debate on 26-27 June when intense 
discussions emerged between government and opposition.  This two-day long 
debate, despite the demand of some MPs to extend it, lasted approximately 10 
hours in total and nearly 89000 words were used.  This extensive debate took 
also the attention of press. The Economist, the weekly journal, had already 
declared its support for the Plan and belief in benefit of participation. On 1st of 
July, it published an article titled “Broker or Brakeman?” In this article, the 
journal was trying to convince its reader that “it is the resemblance, not the 
differences, between the outlook of the Government and Opposition that are 
most striking”. There was an evidence of unity on basic issues despite 
difference “on shades on emphasis and angles of approach”. While both sides 
were supporting “three circles principle”20, the role in each one of the circles 
was a matter of dispute. Therefore it was a matter of decision of choosing who 
would be in the intersection of three circles: “Broker or Brakeman?”21.  
The Economist’s claim could be interpreted as a reminder of the 
“consensus” debate in British politics. First of all, by definition, consensus 
means “agreement on values and norms”. Since it is associated with 
“moderation and reasonableness”, it provides positive connotations. Consensus 
approach embraces the view that the post-war period in Britain “it is the 
massive continuity that stands out”22. As a legacy of war, consensus deriving 
from Keynesian political economy was “a set of commitments, assumptions and 
expectations…shared by the great majority of the country’s political and 
economic leaders”23. Rose also argues that there are many similarities in policy 
preferences of Labour and Conservative Parties regardless of party ideology and 
rhetoric. Due to historical circumstances and factors outside national control, 
                                                            
19 Gowland et al. 2010, p. 33 
20 It is a foreign policy doctrine firstly offered by Winston Churchill locating Britain at the 
intersection of three circles, as the symbols of Commonwealth, United States of America and 
Europe. 
21 The Economist July 1, 1950. 
22 Kavanagh 1992, p. 176-180 
23 Marquand 1988, p. 18. 
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policies on inflation, economic growth, unemployment, distribution of wealth 
became examples of continuity until Thatcher period in British politics24. 
Although consensus approach has a wide range acceptance in the studies 
of British politics, even the most ardent supporters can approve the differences 
of rhetoric between two parties. Especially, in parliamentary debates and party 
conferences, according to Kavanagh and Morris, it is on the surface. While 
Conservative Party preferred to use freedom of opportunity, sustainment of 
Britain’s world leader position, promotion of enterprise and private property 
ownership in its political language, Labour’s rhetoric was shaped around the 
terms such as “emphasised equality, economic planning, fairness, advancing the 
interests of working people and their families, and the multi-racial 
Commonwealth” 25 . Seldon also contributes this debate by reminding that 
consensus does not mean “total agreement between major parties on all aspects 
of policy”. It is not an agreement on ideology and rhetoric. Post-war consensus 
should refer to “the nature of a fragile compromise” instead of a deep-rooted 
agreement26. 
As a result of this exceptional situation of rhetoric, consensus approach is 
criticized by the line of thinking that claims political system in Britain proposes 
the incentives to challenge the position of opposite party as the possibility of 
coalition is low. Dutton argues that consensus politics in Britain “was far from 
complete; it never became total” and adds that British political structure is 
shaped by adversarial rhetoric27. This approach basically embraces that “hostile 
rhetoric and verbal attacks bring electoral advantage” to the political parties. 
Especially, for the opposition party, it turns in to oppose everything the 
government is saying although it would change after assuming the office. 
According to Smith and Aspinwall, the issue of Europe is a particular field of 
policy where it has produced various adversarial cases between the main two 
parties in Britain. According to authors,  
“Since the opposition party does not face the prospect of entering into 
coalition with the governing party, it will attempt to exploit definitive positions 
on issues to its political advantage. In the instance of Europe, these positions 
may be enthusiastically in favour of or rigidly opposed to further integration. 
Adversarialism operates in either case”28.  
                                                            
24 Rose, 1980. 
25 Pimlott et al. 1989, p. 15. 
26 Coxall and Robins 1998, p. 50. 
27 Kavanagh 1992, p. 180. 
28 Smith and Aspinwall 2007. 
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Therefore, government becomes open to any kind of rhetorical attack 
regardless of its position on European integration. As a solution to this, 
government might end up with a tentative stance for its European policy. On the 
one hand, if it fully supports Europe, opposition would be able to attack from 
the loss of sovereignty. On the other hand, it can not reject the alternatives of 
integration as it would be interpreted as isolation from the economic system of 
Europe and degradation of political influence. 
In the light of the insight given by adversary model, the nature of 
parliamentary debate on Schuman Plan on 26-27 can be viewed more in line 
with a rhetorical hostility rather than consensus argued by The Economist. 
Onslow claims that during the debates Conservatives used the Plan only “as a 
stick with which to beat the Government”. Widespread idea within the party 
was if Tories were in power, they would follow the same path with Labour. 
Because for a party that had opposed the nationalisation of steel and iron 
industries, it would be inacceptable to go in line with handing over the control 
of these industries to “a body outside British control”29. As a result, they were 
following a strategic path that might lead to an electoral gain for the next 
election, although what they were supporting was not in line with traditional 
Conservative policy. 
Labour, on the other hand, was also reluctant to appreciate the 
opposition’s initiative as it had already declined the invitation and was seeking 
to be the sole authority on foreign policy issues. Because, Churchill’s 
involvement in foreign policy issues such as The Hague Congress and Council 
of Europe, Bevin’s poor health condition and finally the loss of seats in 
February 1950 general election had shaken the party’s authority. In order to re-
gain its dominance, they needed to produce a particular and characteristic 
Labour approach and exceptionalist rhetoric would be serving to make their 
case legitimate and convincing. By this way both Conservative and Labour 
Party constituted two rival camps during the debate and even the consensus on 
issues such as peace, security and full employment did not help to get them 
closer. Therefore the following part of study was dedicated to analyse the 
differences in Schuman Plan stance of both parties within the context of, firstly, 
non-participation decision itself and its possible results; and secondly, the 
reasons of non-participation. 
 
3. Non-Participation and its Possible Results 
The first area that there was no consensus between the parties was 
actually the very nature of the issue: non-participation as it was the final 
                                                            
29 Onslow 1997, p. 65-66 
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decision of Britain until the date of debate. While the opposition demanded the 
government to join in talks of Schuman Plan with a motion they gave on 26 of 
June, government amended this motion in the same day by declaring the 
impossibility of involvement. To begin with the government’s approach, it was 
insisting on not to take part even in the conference in which details of the 
proposal would be discussed. In the amendment to the motion given by 
opposition, Labour Government was declaring their non-involvement “in the 
international consideration of his [Schuman’s] proposals”30. Therefore, since 
there would be a voting of two conflicting motion and amendment at the end of 
the speeches, the debate was giving the signal of adversarial politics by the 
nature of legislature and decision making. According to Cripps, the Chancellor 
of Exchequer, who proposed the amendment to the House,  France was 
expecting “unity of view” even at the level of negotiations and since it could not 
be established between British and French officials,  “it was no good” to 
involve. For him, one of possible results of wrong decision of participation had 
already been declared to French Government by saying; 
“an unhappy situation would arise if, having bound themselves to certain 
principles without knowing how they would work out in practice, they were to 
find themselves, as a result of the discussion, compelled to withdraw from their 
undertakings”31.  
Moreover, it could have been destructive for the initial agreement 
between France and Germany, if Britain  
“had entered into the negotiations and insisted…upon discussing not how 
to put into operation the principles but whether the principle, for instance, of the 
new high authority with supra-national powers was or was not acceptable”32. 
By this way, Labour government was claiming that Britain, by declaring 
its non-involvement from the beginning, saved not only itself from an 
undesirable situation but also the future of Franco-German relationship. With 
this rhetoric, the government was trying to construct an image of Britain 
showing its grace and mercy for European states in need. 
Opposition, on the other hand, believed in the benefit of being 
represented in the discussions at least. Wording of the motion was prepared 
carefully as the party did not want to be seen fully supporting the Schuman 
Plan 33 . However, direction of MP’s speech was changing towards to 
                                                            
30 Hansard, 26 June 1950, vol 476, column 1933. 
31 Hansard, 26 June 1950, vol 476, column 1937. 
32 Hansard, 26 June 1950, vol 476, column 1937. 
33 Onslow 1997, p. 65. 
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participation to the Plan itself at some point and this was clear even in Eden’s 
opening speech: 
“Would we be prepared to enter discussions as a result of which a high 
authority would be set up whose decisions would be binding upon the nations 
who were parties to the agreement? My answer to that question would be, yes, 
provided…that we were satisfied with the conditions and the safeguards”34. 
In addition to Eden’s stance, some other Conservative MPs were also 
directly supporting the Plan, such as Edward Heath, who made his maiden 
speech during the debate. According to future Prime Minister Heath and the one 
realizing the accession of Britain to EEC: 
“…magnanimity in politics is not seldom the truest wisdom. I appeal 
tonight to the Government to follow that dictum and to go into the Schuman 
Plan to develop Europe and to co-ordinate it in the way suggested”35.  
As opposed to government’s “grace and mercy” in the case of not joining 
to Schuman Plan’s discussions, opposition were using rhetoric of “threat”. 
Given the environment of Cold War, it was, first of all, Soviet Russia that could 
be brought the agenda of the House. Fitzeroy Maclean, Lancester MP of the 
Conservative Party, was arguing that Russians 
 “hate the idea of this country going in on the Schuman Plan… Why are 
the Russians showing this sudden concern for our welfare? Why are they so 
anxious that we should keep out of the Schuman Plan? It is because they realise 
-and I wish I thought Members opposite realised it- the immense political, 
economic and, above all, strategic importance of this issue. It is because they 
realise that in British participation in the Schuman Plan lies our best hope of a 
genuinely united Europe, a Europe strong enough to be an effective barrier to 
any further expansion or aggression on their part in the West. That is why they 
are against it”36.  
Conservative Party leader, Churchill had already criticized Soviet 
ideology in 1920 by claiming it was “a pestilence more destructive of life than 
the Black Death or the Spotted ‘Typhus’”37. Labour government, on the other 
hand, kept its distance towards Soviet Union despite its claims of being a 
“socialist” party. According to Foreign Minister Bevin informing his cabinet in 
1948, 
“not only is the Soviet Government not prepared at the present stage to 
co-operate in any real sense with any non-Communist or non-Communist 
                                                            
34 Hansard, 26 June 1950, vol 476, column 1916. 
35 Hansard, 26 June 1950, vol 476, column 1964. 
36 Hansard, 26 June 1950, vol 476, column 2034-2035. 
37 Warner 1996, p. 294 
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controlled Government, but it is actively preparing to extend its hold over the 
remaining part of continental Europe and, subsequently, over the Middle East 
and no doubt the bulk of the Far East as well. In other words, physical control of 
the whole World Island is what the Politburo is aiming at- no less a thing than 
that”38. 
These negative Soviet perceptions of the two main political parties were 
reflecting on the public opinion. Results of a poll from 1948 was showing that 
“no less than 91 percent of Britons believed that the Soviet Union wanted to 
dominate the world, compared with only 38 per cent of Italians and 30 per cent 
of French people”39. Therefore Conservative Party was confidently using Soviet 
threat argument in the debate on Schuman Plan to knock the government out. 
Not just Soviet Russia but also the Germans could be a source of threat in 
the case of rejection of Schuman Plan according to David Eccles, Conservative 
MP for Chippenham. It was just after five years since the end of Second World 
War and Germany was still an issue of concern in the minds of British people. 
Therefore, it could be a convincing argument to get support for the motion. 
Eccles was basically saying that: 
“There is no advance towards a stable peace and security at the same rate 
as Germany and Russia seem to be growing stronger. It is this anxiety to 
prevent another war that accounts for the astounding welcome given to the 
Schuman plan…. That is why the British refusal to enter these talks was and is 
utterly incomprehensible to the restless and nervous millions living between us 
and the Iron Curtain”40.  
Some Conservatives were also underlining that even without the 
emergence of potential threats, Schuman Plan, in contrast to Labour party’s 
stance, would fail after British non-participation by being replaced by Franco-
German cartel and this time Franco-German rapprochement was seen as a threat 
to British interests. 
 
3.1. Dutch Problem 
The Netherlands had made a reservation before they accepted to take part 
in discussions of the Plan. This issue was referred in the motion given by 
opposition. For Conservatives, if Dutch Government could raise its reservation 
to go back on the condition that Plan was not working for the interest of the 
country, there would be no obstacle for Britain to do the same. However the 
Dutch case was not interpreted in the same way by the two parties.  
                                                            
38 Warner 1996, p. 306 
39 Warner 1996, p. 306 
40 Hansard, 26 June 1950, vol 476, column 1970. 
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For Labour Party, following the Dutch example “to incite the 
Government” was “pathetic”41. Trade volumes and partners of Britain and the 
Netherlands were even incomparable. Moreover, it was a risk taking according 
to the Chancellor and these risks would not create same effects for different 
scale of economies. At the end of the day, it was acceptable for Dutch 
government to take related risks.  
“I can easily understand the Netherlands Government being prepared to 
take a risk in view of the small part of their economy that will be affected and 
accepting the principle without knowledge as to how it was to be applied or 
whether it could be applied, but I could not understand any British Government 
taking that risk with a major part, indeed, it may almost be said with the whole, 
of its economy at stake”42. 
Cripps was also underrating the scale of economy in the Netherlands with 
below words: 
“It is one thing to contemplate the possibility of the withdrawal of a 
Government responsible for only one-fortieth of the coal production and 
1/150th of steel production and quite another to risk the withdrawal on this basis 
of a country with one-half of the coal and one-third of the steel production. The 
two cases are not comparable”43. 
Belittling the scale of economy was an important tool of exceptionalist 
discourse for British foreign policy. A few months after Schuman Plan debates 
in the House of Commons, Prime Minister Attlee, this time, would be arguing 
that Britain was not “a simple Luxembourg”. At the end, “these small countries” 
were all saved politically and economically by Britain in the war. Therefore 
they could not be taken as an economic and political model44. 
However, for opposition, Dutch case was a safeguard for Britain and 
safeguards were the power that would shape, guide and judge the Schuman 
Plan. By this way, opposition was leaving no room for the will of other 
countries taking part in the Plan. Moreover, safeguards were so omnipotent in 
the eyes of Conservatives that they were enough to convince them for the 
abrogation of national sovereignty. As opposed to Dutch example speeches of 
Conservatives, Onslow argued that, many party members did not like the Dutch 
analogy idea, privately, as the Netherlands were already happy with a federal 
alternative. Therefore motion was implying for the public the acceptance of 
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supra-national character of the Plan which was a departure from traditional 
Conservative policy45. 
 
4. Reasons of Non-Participation 
The reasons of Labour government’s decision of non-participation were 
also a major tension between two parties.  From Labour side; first of all, it was 
the prominence of coal and steel industries. These industries were so immense 
that other states could “gang up” against Britain and this could increase the 
prices. Opposition, on the other hand, was accepting importance of these 
industries to a certain extent. Yet it could be temporary, according to 
Conservative MP Colonel Claude Lancaster: 
“Before the war, we were on the whole rather expensive steelmakers, and 
we produced coal somewhat more cheaply than on the continent. Today the 
position is reversed. We are producing steel more cheaply than on the continent, 
and we are producing coal more expensively. We are confronted with this 
problem: If we stand outside these conversations and plan,…it will have the 
effect of squeezing us out of our traditional European markets”46.  
In other words, recovery of European markets was fast and Britain 
needed to take necessary precautions by joining to Europeans. Moreover, even 
these temporary advantages of British coal and steel industry would not be a 
priority and comprehensible within the context of Cold War situation. 
Secondly, impossibility of consensus on the concepts of high authority, 
supra-nationalism and federalism led to another line of adversarial approach 
between Labour and Conservatives. For Labour, the binding nature of high 
authority was one of the biggest concerns. It was something not natural but 
“invented”. Labour MP James Carmichael was expressing that; 
“The French say that before the conference begins we have to accept the 
idea of a high authority, an authority standing above the governments of the 
countries participating. That is the first thing, and therefore our Government 
have laid it down...why they refuse to enter a conference which accepts the idea 
of a high authority standing above governments”47. 
As the above quotation would tell us, high authority as referring the 
condition of being above the governments, supra-national could either be an 
adjective of high authority or a synonym for it and it was an indispensable part 
of the Schuman Plan. Basically, according to Labour party, “Everything is 
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vague in the Schuman Plan, except one thing, the supra-national authority”48. In 
addition, due to this vagueness, it was normal to have reluctance towards this 
new institutional structure because there was no similar one until then as all 
other institutions that Britain was part of had international character which 
meant national governments could have the last word on decisions. 
According to Labour Party, federalism was another concept that supra-
nationalism had to be identified with. It could be the inevitable result of an 
institution under the rule of High Authority. Since France was in favour of 
federalism as a country lacking of self-confidence, it was better to inform 
French Government in advance that “no responsible party in this country 
[Britain] is willing to undertake federal union within any foreseeable time”49. 
Knowing that the concept of “federalism” could get a negative reaction from the 
Conservative benches, the government kept using it as a potential threat and 
natural consequence of involvement in the Schuman Plan. The decision of 
rejection was related with the perception of both for supra-nationalism and 
federalism at the same time. 
However, Conservatives approached High Authority issue in a moderate 
even sometimes supporting way. For them, Britain had already abated its ideas 
on sovereignty. Given the conditions of memberships in Atomic Energy 
Commission under UN, OEEC etc., it would not be hard to accept the existence 
of High Authority under Schuman Plan. Moreover the ambiguity on the term 
could not be a reason of rejecting involvement in the talks. In this line, 
Conservative MP Julian Amery was arguing that; 
“we cannot object to it on the ground of its powers until we have 
discussed them and contributed to their formation because we do not know what 
they will be. We cannot object to the question of to whom it will be responsible 
because that is not yet decided…. It seems to me to be very unwise to reject a 
thing out of hand when we do not know what it is”50. 
Federalism, on the other, was something different than supra-nationalism 
and existence of High Authority according to Conservative Party, but even if 
Europe was trying to achieve this ideal, Britain, according to leader of the 
opposition, Churchill, would be there to 
“favour and help forward all developments on the Continent which arise 
naturally from a removal of barriers, from the process of reconciliation, and 
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blessed oblivion of the terrible past, and also from…common dangers in the 
future and present”51.  
Because at the end of the day it was the Labour government’s hostility 
that led to “tiresome and pedantic” approach of Schuman’s insistence on 
surrender of sovereignty and this was a belief shared also by The Economist. 
Thirdly, Britain’s role in Commonwealth, Empire and Atlantic triangle 
was another topic that was brought to agenda of the debate. Labour Party, 
during this debate, became the ardent supporter of relations with 
Commonwealth by putting it in front of all other developments in Europe. It 
was also reminding the distinctive and exceptional position of Empire and 
Commonwealth. Supporting Schuman Plan and safeguarding the relations with 
Commonwealth were not compatible at all, especially when the strategic 
industries were at stake. Chancellor Cripps was arguing that; 
“Our special trading relationships with the Commonwealth and Empire 
must likewise be greatly affected by the conduct of these two basic industries. 
Not only so, but the location and distribution of these industries in Western 
Europe are matters of the highest strategic importance”52.  
Moreover, Government was thinking that previous examples on 
integration as British initiatives did not create an obstacle for the conduct of 
relations with Commonwealth; Chancellor was also adding that; 
“Throughout all this period of intense intra -European activity, we have 
been able to carry the Commonwealth with us, and we have not in any way 
sacrificed the interests of the Commonwealth to those of Europe- nor have we 
done the reverse. It will be a bad day for everyone if it is ever sought to set 
intra-European interests against those of the Commonwealth”53.  
On the other hand Conservative Party, traditionally accepted as the party 
of Empire and related relations, was following a different path during debates. 
First of all, it was claimed by Conservative MP Robert Boothby that; 
“there was no responsible European statesman at Strasbourg who did not 
believe and declare that the Commonwealth must be closely associated with 
European union at every stage. They know perfectly well that without the 
Commonwealth and without their own overseas associated territories, Western 
Europe can never hope to be viable either politically or economically”54.  
Moreover, involving in the discussions of Schuman Plan was not against 
the interest of Commonwealth and Empire. Yet despite this assumed trust in 
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relations, opposition could not stop questioning government if they had 
consulted to Commonwealth states before taking the decision of non-
participation. Another aspect of the issue was the ongoing problems in trade 
relations with Commonwealth. Some Conservative MPs reviewed the matter 
and found the solution in Schuman Plan. One of them was Julian Amery 
concluding that; 
“The truth is that the United Kingdom cannot provide today all the 
capital goods the Commonwealth requires. Nor is our market, great as it is, big 
enough to consume all the raw materials, or all the foodstuffs, which the 
Commonwealth can, or could, produce. These domestic limitations of our own 
impose a certain limit, for the moment, on the development of the 
Commonwealth; but if, by participation in a plan such as M. Schuman has 
adumbrated, we could somehow direct some of the productive power of the 
Ruhr and French industry to the development of the Commonwealth and the 
Colonial Empire”55.  
Opposition was also emphasizing the generosity of Europe that was in 
need of integration. If Britain would share the possible difficulties due to 
Commonwealth bonds, Europe would be ready to “do their best to meet 
them”56. 
Finally, it was the ideological connotations that shaped the stance and 
rhetoric of two parties and there was no clear sign of consensus on this matter 
either. Socialism was one of the key concepts in this matter. Since “European 
Unity” document was newly emerged, government was carrying “the burden” 
of the arguments in it to the debate. What Labour government was doing during 
the debate is to vindicate socialism and show its contribution on European 
integration. Arthur Irvine, Labour MP for Liverpool Edge Hill, was claiming 
that;  
“In this country today we have a Labour Government, recently returned 
after four and a half arduous years of office, recently returned with the support 
of a party which received two million more votes than any other party in the 
country. That is a fresh mandate to the Labour Party which believes that the 
solution to this problem of integrating European industry and production is a 
Socialist solution”57.  
For Labour party, socialism was also directly related with democratic 
procedure that was something missing in Schuman Plan structure. High 
Authority meant giving up parliamentary democratic values of Britain. As 
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opposed to the concept of democracy which was provided by socialist 
government of the country thanks to the nationalization of industries, high 
authority would not have democratic responsibility and would be an example of 
“oligarchy imposed on Europe…with arbitrary power and enormous 
influence”58. Instead of following these alternatives proposed by Schuman Plan, 
Europe would have to find the only answer for unity within the framework of 
socialism. Irvine was also proposing that; 
“There is only one fundamental and effective solution to the problem of 
the development of European economic unity, and that is the Socialist one. The 
ideal chance of solving the great problem which exists in developing European 
unity would come by the co-operation of like-minded Socialist Governments”59. 
Interpretation of socialism in Conservative Party in relation to Schuman 
Plan was totally different. Socialism was one of the important reasons that the 
government stand aside of the Plan and it was offering everything opposite to 
necessities of integration. In the view of David Eccles; 
“British Socialists are next to Communists in rejecting international 
arrangements for full employment. The Socialist Government relies upon 
physical controls, bilateral treaties, exchange control, and so on”60. 
Moreover it was the source of isolationism and nationalism. This insular 
socialism of Labour Party led to nationalisation and nationalism to go hand in 
hand. Although the Opposition was not against the policy of full employment 
and believed that Schuman Plan would be helping to reach this aim, 
nationalisation policy of government was inacceptable and could not be a cause 
not to be involved in the talks. In line with Conservative’s ideological 
criticisms, The Economist was also reminding the suspicion for the 
Government’s pretext of “wider responsibilities and commitments” to serve for 
its isolation and socialism. 
 
Conclusions 
The article published on The Economist was a reflection of journal’s call 
for Britain to join Schuman Plan. By claiming the consensus between the two 
parties, the journal was trying to establish a common ground and imply a 
positive connotation on the idea of Schuman Plan. Moreover it was offered as 
the moderate and reasonable alternative to British decision makers. However as 
it was analysed above, parliamentary debates on Schuman Plan were a strategic 
clash of Conservative and Labour Parties. The decision of non-participation, 
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reasons and possible effects of it were all a matter of conflict. In addition, the 
nature of voting for the motion and amendment created polarization in the 
House of Commons, because at the time of the debate, British parliament was 
working with the function of not just consultation, but also decision making. 
On the other hand, party positions during the debates were not 
emphasizing the traditional party lines. Labour Party prioritising 
Commonwealth and Empire as opposed to internationalism emphasized by 
Conservative MPs as a gift of European integration could only be examples of 
constructed strategy within the context of adversarial approaches of each party. 
While the government was trying to gain its authority back in foreign affairs, 
the opposition was there to just oppose and create an electoral advantage given 
the fact that the majority of Labour Party was only five in the parliament. 
Last, but not least, adversarial nature of the debate sometimes created an 
exceptionalist rhetoric during the debate, especially in Government’s speeches 
as it was pushed by the Opposition to take a clear stand against Europe and 
exceptionalism could be appreciated in the eyes of public even if the decision of 
non-participation was not wholeheartedly embraced. 
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